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This article argues against all forms of scientism and the 
widespread perceived need to define martial arts in order to 
study martial arts or ‘do’ martial arts studies. It argues instead for 
the necessity of theory before definition, including theorisation 
of the orientation of the field of martial arts studies itself. 
Accordingly, the chapter criticises certain previous (and current) 
academic approaches to martial arts, particularly the failed 
project of hoplology. It then examines the much more promising 
approaches of current scholarship, such as that of Sixt Wetzler, 
before critiquing certain aspects of its orientation. Instead of 
accepting Wetzler’s ‘polysystem theory’ approach uncritically, 
the article argues instead for the value of a poststructuralist 
‘discourse’ approach in martial arts studies.
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emerging fields, where senses of tradition and tacit agreements about 
convention have yet to be set.
This is the situation of martial arts studies today, in which huge 
disciplinary differences are palpable from one work to the next. Such 
vast differences are present because even though the emergence of the 
field is being driven by a sense of shared and communal investment 
in an object (‘martial arts’), this shared interest is not yet matched by 
anything like a shared approach. In other words, the shared academic 
interest in ‘martial arts’ is currently drawing together academics from 
many very different fields. Yet the deceptiveness of the term ‘martial 
arts’ combined with the diversity of this community, with its myriad 
premises, multiple perspectives, methods and orientations, seems to 
necessitate the creation of some kind of consensus around the object, 
field and approach to ‘martial arts’. Hence, understandably, people feel 
the need to establish a definition of martial arts [Jones 2002; Lorge 2012; 
Lorge 2016; but see also Judkins 2016b].
Because of this perceived necessity, at this point, many works would 
move directly into a discussion of definitions, attempting to settle the 
matter of which definition of martial arts should and should not be 
used, and where and when [Channon 2016; Lorge 2016]. However, 
rather than entering into the discussion about how best to define 
martial arts, in what follows I will instead argue that the question of the 
definition of martial arts is both a distraction and a red herring for the 
emerging field of martial arts studies. The more pressing task, I argue, 
is not the establishment of a consensus around the definition of our 
object. Rather, it is the establishment of a shared, circumspect, literate 
and analytical, theoretically informed critical discourse with rigorously 
formulated problematics that can contribute in diverse ways to both 
academic and public debates.
In short, I argue somewhat against the current of recent debates, and 
even against the grain of many academic approaches, that we do not 
need to define martial arts at all. Rather, I propose that we need to 
theorise the entire field or nexus of research, including the place, point 
and purpose of definition within it. Indeed, my contention is that if we 
allow ourselves to be animated by defining martial arts without both 
theorising and constructing the field, then martial arts studies may 
founder and fail, like so many past attempts to establish an academic 
field of study for martial arts.2
2  For an important and valuable contrast to this argument, see Peter Lorge’s 
recent work [Lorge 2016], which argues against using theory – because it is difficult and 
off-putting – and instead for the virtues of deepening and refining historical knowledge. 
As Lorge sees it, deeper historical knowledge can both enrich martial artists’ practice and 
clearly illustrate to the academic community the value of martial arts as a valid topic of 
academic study. I believe it is possible to concede Lorge’s points and still argue for the value 
and necessity of theory ‘before’ or ‘beneath’ this.
Dealing with Disciplinary Difference
I was once invited to contribute a chapter to a collection being prepared 
on martial arts and embodied knowledge. When all the draft chapters 
were in and the editors were happy with the collection, the entire 
manuscript was then sent off to be assessed by two academic reviewers. 
Of my own contribution, one reviewer said: the chapter by Bowman is 
terrible; it is not publishable, and should be rejected. The other reviewer 
said: the chapter by Bowman is the best contribution to this volume, 
and greatly enhances and enriches it. Faced with two diametrically 
opposed views from two presumably equally reliable peer reviewers,1 
the editors themselves held the casting vote. They decided that they 
liked the chapter overall, thought it had value, and wanted to include it. 
But they elected to share the reviews with me and invited me to make 
any changes I thought appropriate in light of them.
The experience of receiving such polarised views was educational. I 
share this anecdote here to introduce a cluster of interrelated issues. 
These start with the matter of how to establish value in an emergent 
academic discourse, the problematic of bias attendant to all acts and 
processes of evaluation and verification, and the fact that the shape, 
form, borderlines, organisation and orientation of academic fields are 
neither natural nor inevitable. Rather, these emerge in negotiation with 
decisions made by a host of agents and agencies, including academics, 
editors, reviewers, research councils, funding bodies, and publishers, all 
of whom make their evaluations with reference to established criteria 
and values. Accordingly, decisions as to what good or bad work looks 
like, and what ‘deserves’ to be published, are themselves reflective 
of values tied into interpretations of what good, correct or proper 
academic work in this field ‘should’ look like.
This does not mean that everything is already decided or 
overdetermined by pre-established ‘structures’ or ‘systems’. Rather, 
it means that senses of propriety, validity, appropriateness, fit, and 
so on, are always establishments or achievements that are ongoing, in 
negotiation, subject to dispute, up for question, challenge, revision 
and review. Such negotiation and renegotiation can be perceived in 
all academic disciplines, but it is inevitably more cacophonic in newly 
1  At the time, the emerging field that we now call martial arts studies was 
yet to be established, and the editors later commented that they had actually struggled 
to find suitable academics to act as peer reviewers who were not already contributors to 
the collection itself. Today there would be peer reviewers aplenty for such a collection. 
This could be taken to demonstrate many things, including the proposition that the 
establishment of an academic field involves not only the establishment of (new) shared 
objects of attention, shared problematics and shared methodologies, but also the 
production of (new) academic subjects – i.e., individual scholars with a recognisable 
disciplinary identity, conferred or established reciprocally in the process of emergence of the 
discourse itself.
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for martial arts. Most famously, of course, Richard Burton in the 19th 
century and Donn Draeger later in the 20th century attempted to found 
and ground an academic discipline that they called ‘hoplology’ [for an 
overview, see Spencer 2011]. However, this or these projects repeatedly 
foundered. The question is: why?
Even more pertinently, perhaps, is the related question of why a 
connected field of martial arts studies took until today to begin to 
emerge at all. Consider the fact that over the last two decades it became 
increasingly easy to carry out online academic searches and to discover 
that all sorts of different kinds of studies of all sorts of issues involving 
martial arts are being carried out across a surprising number of different 
disciplines. Yet there have been few sustained dialogues and fewer 
dedicated spaces for the academic study of martial arts.3
My contention is that the matter of the approach or paradigm is central 
to both questions. It relates not only to all failed past attempts to 
establish any kind of martial arts studies but also to the stubborn non-
appearance of martial arts studies until today, despite scattered studies 
of martial arts in diverse disciplines.
To consider the recent situation first: there is a sense in which the 
very heterogeneity of the ways of approaching martial arts – the very 
richness of the potential field – may paradoxically have played a part 
in preventing the creation of a single interconnected, interacting 
field. The logic of this proposition is as follows: the creation of an 
academic discourse requires the emergence of shared problematics and 
discussions around – at the very least – matters of which questions 
are to be asked and which methodologies are best suited for their 
exploration. Yet, in recent decades, although there have been a great 
number of academic studies on all manner of things to do with martial 
arts, no single field or conversation has emerged, because of the very 
heterogeneity of approaches to radically heterogeneous questions.4
3  The long-running Electronic Journals of Martial Arts and Sciences is a 
noteworthy project that has attempted to construct such dialogues and spaces (http://
ejmas.com/). I defer a discussion of this project here, however, in order to focus on more 
‘stark’ examples, at this time, for clarity.
4 Moreover, far from informing, enlivening and expanding academic discourses 
on martial arts, the heterogeneity of approaches and diversity of kinds of work actually 
seems to have prevented many people from reading, engaging, or even being aware of the 
plethora of academic literature being produced on martial arts across the disciplines. Works 
continue to appear that present themselves as if they are the first to deal with the martial 
arts. Whether proceeding by making grand proclamations to this effect or by lacking a basic 
literature review, the net result is the same. (Thanks to Ben Judkins for making this point in 
personal email communication.)
Approaching Martial Arts Studies
Before following through on this, some further reflection on my 
opening anecdote seems called for. Ironically, even back at the time 
of this brush between my work and two border guards at the gates 
of a then unclear and embryonic field, I had already long accepted 
Roland Barthes’ argument that readers can and will have very different 
responses to the same text [Barthes 1977]. But I had never encountered 
such symmetrically opposed opinions from scholars I had presumed 
must work to some degree in the ‘same’ area – i.e., holding an academic 
interest in ‘martial arts’ refracted through one or another approach of 
the arts or humanities. The vastly differing verdicts surprised me even 
though I already believed I knew that academic disciplines are spaces of 
argumentation and disagreement rather than consensus. Today, I am 
no longer surprised by the appearance of such difference in what is still 
a very young and uncertain field. Indeed, as mentioned, encountering 
extreme disciplinary differences is currently our daily bread. The 
question is: is such diversity simply something to be either shrugged off 
or celebrated, or might it harbour a problem? What might it mean if the 
object and field of martial arts studies continues to be conceived of very 
differently by different people from different disciplinary backgrounds? 
In short, is it a problem that we are still frequently experiencing such 
widely differing approaches to the academic study martial arts?
On the one hand, no. There will always be disciplinary difference, and 
even vast differences in conceptuality and orientation within ‘the same’ 
discipline or field. Different academic origins and kinds of training 
bring with them differing questions, differing objects of attention, 
differing values, methods, and so on. And for the foreseeable future, 
martial arts studies will inevitably be built from work and approaches 
hailing from different disciplines. Moreover, no-one will ever be 
surprised, for instance, if a study of martial arts as they appear in one 
or more works of literature differs significantly from a study focused 
on questions of experiments in or around pedagogy [compare Liu 2011 
with Lefebvre 2016 for instance]. So where might the problem come in?
Far be it from me to advocate any kind of unitary, univocal, mono-
disciplinary or monoculturalist approach in martial arts studies. That 
would be neither desirable nor possible. Nonetheless, in order for a 
field or discipline to emerge and survive, there must be coherent and 
meaningful internal (community) and external (cross-disciplinary) 
discourses and exchanges. In order for this to happen, the matter of 
what we might call ‘the approach’ is important. There are stakes and 
consequences attached to the matter of the paradigms that organise our 
efforts.
To illustrate, one might briefly consider the possible reasons for the 
repeated failure of attempts to create a field of academic study of and 
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and its flawed theoretical orientations – in other words, its flawed 
paradigm and approach.
There are many possible ways to illustrate the conceptual and 
orientation problems at the heart of hoplology. But for the sake of 
brevity and clarity I will limit myself to one quick example. This is 
taken from the front page text of the International Hoplology Society 
website,5 which proudly trumpets the ‘three axioms of hoplology’. 
These three axioms are:
1. The foundation of human combative behavior is rooted in 
our evolution. To gain a realistic understanding of human 
combative behavior, it is necessary to have a basic grasp of its 
evolutionary background.
2. The two basic forms of human combative behavior are 
predatory and affective. Predatory combative behavior is 
that combative/aggressive behavior rooted in our evolution 
as a hunting mammal. Affective combative behavior is that 
aggressive/combative behavior rooted in our evolution as a 
group-social animal.
3. The evolution of human combative behavior and 
performance is integral with the use of weapons. That is, 
behavior and performance is intrinsically linked to and 
reflects the use of weapons. 
[‘About the International Hopology Society’ 2016]
From an academic point of view, the fundamental problem with 
these axioms is that they are not academic. Rather, they are tenets, 
beliefs, and assertions. They may appear scientific on first glance, but 
they are actually scientistic. Specifically, they reflect an attempt to 
align hoplology with the controversial (and equally dubious) field of 
sociobiology [Wilson 1975], which itself has long been accused of 
scientism and biological determinism, among other things [Schreier 
5  Although focusing on such an example may be open to the criticism that it 
has not been taken from a properly academic context and so should not be subjected to 
academic critique, nonetheless this example has been selected because these are words 
that have been placed ‘front and centre’ and presented as expressing the heart of the 
hoplological academic project.
What seems key to disciplinary emergence is a sense of a shared project. 
But, this does not mean that a field demands a unitary or univocal 
approach. Far from it. Taking too limited a conception of the object 
and of the field, particularly when this is combined with too limited 
or problematic an approach, can equally stymie growth. This might 
be illustrated by a consideration of perhaps the most well-known past 
attempt to establish a field for the academic study of martial arts – 
hoplology.
Hoplological Hopes
Hoplology is surely the most famous example of the failure of martial 
arts studies to attain a stable and sustainable academic presence. 
According to the website of the International Hoplology Society, 
hoplology was founded by Sir Richard F. Burton in the 19th century. 
However, it then (says the website) ‘remained dormant’, until Donn 
Draeger picked up the baton at some unspecified point, after the 
1960s, a baton he carried until his death [‘About the International 
Hopology Society’ 2016]. The International Hoplology Society is 
now based in Hawaii, and presents itself as ‘an independent, not-for-
profit organization’ which ‘offers its services to scholars, universities, 
museums, collectors, private and governmental organizations, writers 
and publishers around the world’ [‘About the International Hopology 
Society’ 2016].
Given this evidence of its continued and current existence, readers may 
be surprised by my claim that hoplology is a failed academic project. 
Hoplology still exists. The published work of Donn Draeger itself is 
of mythic status in most narratives of the history of Western attempts 
to establish serious and reliable scholarly knowledge of East Asian 
martial arts. Nonetheless, what provides the clearest evidence that 
the project failed is the lack of any significant academic presence for 
hoplology. It is neither a discipline, nor a discourse, nor an unfolding 
research programme, nor an interdisciplinary nexus of debate. The 
fact that hoplology continues to haunt us in the form of the hopes and 
aspirations of its proponents does not change the fact that as a field of 
study it never really made it to where any such field of study most wants 
to be – the university. The university was always where Draeger and 
other proponents wanted hoplology to be. But it never really made it.
It ‘never really made it’ for lots of different kinds of reasons. There were 
of course both personal and ‘political’ elements at work that arguably 
hampered Draeger’s attempts to get hoplology into a university 
[Miracle 2015]. But my contention is that, more significantly, there 
have always been fundamental obstacles to its academic survival, and 
that these have always boiled down its flawed conceptions of its object 
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This article seeks to contribute to such a reflection, by moving away 
from failed projects like hoplology and discussing instead some 
significant recent contributions to the crucial debate about what martial 
arts studies is and how it might elaborate itself and develop. Before 
engaging with these, however, it will be worthwhile to give some more 
attention to the matter of the significance for academic discourses of 
differing approaches and values.
Moving from ‘Thing Itself’ to ‘Field Itself’
One helpful way to understand why differences of opinion and 
orientation will always occur within academic disciplines and discourses 
is proposed by arch-poststructuralist Jacques Derrida [Derrida and 
Ferraris 2003]. Derrida proposes that academic fields are essentially 
always at war with themselves. The reason for this is that they 
essentially construct both their own objects and approaches and their 
own yardsticks for evaluating them. In this sense, a discipline essentially 
‘constructs the object of argumentation and the field of argumentation 
itself’ [Arditi 2008: 115]. There is no immutable or incontestable 
fixed point outside of the discipline’s own discourse from which to 
adjudicate anything that takes place within it. But what takes place 
within it depends on a host of variables, including preferences in terms 
of premises, protocols, practices, procedures, and so on. Therefore, 
Derrida proposes that:
A field is determined as a field of battle because there is no 
metalanguage, no locus of truth outside the field, no absolute 
and ahistorical overhang; and this absence of overhang – in 
other words, the radical historicity of the field – makes the 
field necessarily subject to multiplicity and heterogeneity. As 
a result, those who are inscribed in this field are necessarily 
inscribed in a polemos, even if they have no special taste for 
war. There is a strategic destiny, destined to stratagem by the 
question raised over the truth of the field.  
[Derrida and Ferraris 2003: 13]
Any academic field is ‘a field of battle because there is no metalanguage, 
no locus of truth outside the field’. This ‘makes the field necessarily 
subject to multiplicity and heterogeneity’. Hence, when faced with 
divergent opinions or evaluations of any given approach, argument, 
assessment or experiment within a field, there can be no simple appeal 
to any higher authority outside the field.7 After all, how could anyone 
7  During the 1980s, much was made of the fact that such a perspective reveals 
that there is always an aporia at work in the legitimation of knowledge [Derrida 1992], 
a kind of ineradicable tautology, and even what Lyotard called a ‘legitimation crisis in 
knowledge’ [Lyotard 1984 (1979)].
et al. 2016; Bethell 2016].6 The function of these scientific-sounding 
‘axioms’ on the homepage is to gesture to the society’s declared 
commitment to scholarship and research. Unfortunately, this gesture 
actually demonstrates the opposite: it reveals its constitutively 
doctrinaire orientation. As such, the text commits quite a few academic 
crimes, which all effectively add up to a kind of unintentional (but 
certain) self-ostracising and auto-abdication from the world of serious 
academic debate and discussion.
Of course, neither Burton nor Draeger were the author of these 
words. But it is clear that the table was already set and the door opened 
to welcome them in advance by the kinds of approach common to 
hoplology since the beginning. This is such a limited raison d’être, 
articulated with reference to and in terms of a very limited and 
problematic deployment of an already problematic set of contentions. 
So it will always be highly unlikely to pass as academic in any field or 
context. Few, if any, 21st or even 20th century academic journals, for 
instance, would accept any allegedly academic article that proceeded 
according to such ‘axioms’ (as the case of Gottschall, discussed in the 
earlier footnote, illustrates [Gottschall 2015]).
Rather than this, in order to thrive within academia, what is required is 
something very different. Specifically, martial arts studies must emerge 
as a coherent communicative self-sustaining field of meaningful and 
productive exchanges and interactions that might be diversely relevant. 
To do so it will be necessary to undertake a sustained and explicit 
examination of and engagement with the stakes and consequences of 
the different conceptualisations, orientations and methods available 
to the field. This implies a sustained reflection on premises, remits, 
orientations and methods, along with ongoing dialogues with other 
disciplines and the principled awareness of other established and 
unfolding approaches across academia. Any conceptualisation of the 
field that starts out as an apologetic exercise for only a single set of 
assumptions or methods by definition cannot do this, and will be highly 
unlikely to attract wider academic interest.
6  The semi-autobiographical pseudo-academic book, The Professor in the Cage: 
Why Men Fight and Why We Like To Watch by Jonathan Gottschall, is perhaps the most 
well-known recent iteration of this kind of deeply problematic approach [Gottschall 2015]. 
The book, appropriately, starts from the failure of an English professor’s ongoing project to 
persuade anyone to use ideas from evolutionary biology in literary studies. From this failure, 
Gottschall turns to his stagnating academic career and the birth of his interest in MMA. In 
all of this, the book applies simplistic sociobiologistic ideas to the subject of ‘fighting’. There 
is much that might be said about the limitations and skewing effects of all such pseudo-, 
crypto- and actual sociobiologistic approaches, and they warrant sustained critique. But such 
critiques should be careful to avoid being dragged into a scientistic cul-de-sac. There are far 
better approaches to ‘fighting’ available than those which rush naively and crudely to ideas 
of evolutionary advantage [see for example Gong 2015; Jackson-Jacobs 2013].
The Definition of Martial Arts Studies
Paul Bowman
MARTIAL  
ARTS STUDIES
11martialartsstudies.org
Again, these are battles around the question of the paradigm (or 
paradigms) that structure a field. The choice of paradigm determines 
the kind of questions that can be asked, the type of work that will 
seem to ‘need’ to be done, and the ways in which such work will be 
approached.
Reflecting on the ways that academic disciplines and universities 
work, Derrida argued that what takes place within academic discourses 
involves ‘not an opposition between the legitimate and the illegitimate, 
but rather a very complicated distribution of the demands of legitimacy’ 
[Derrida 2003: 18]. At the very least, then, the determination of such 
matters as best versus worst is no simple matter. It does not easily come 
down to a clear question of whether something is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. For, 
if there is no fixed point outside of and transcending the field, then the 
source of the determination of such values can only come from within 
the field itself – from among the paradigms constructed within it.
The problem is that because there will always be more than one 
paradigm in play (and in process), there will be no sustained consensus 
arising within the field. In a sense, there are only ever shared, modified 
or replaced problematics, and rarely any widely held consensus about 
the formulation of the object, the parameters of the problem, or the 
framework for any exploration or method of approach.
The proposition that academic disciplines are battlegrounds may either 
disappoint or delight. It may disappoint those who cleave to the idea 
that academic disciplines principally trade in the establishment of 
truth about reality, and that they find out and know more and more 
about truth and reality as time goes on, as the discipline progresses. 
Conversely, the idea of disciplines as battlegrounds may appeal to 
others, and for any number of reasons. However, it is important to 
point out that the type of ‘war’ being formulated by Derrida here is 
not some Darwinian or neoliberal notion of ‘survival of the fittest’. 
Rather, Derrida is making a claim about the inevitable and inescapable 
emergence of pluralities of voices, positions and styles of attempting to 
establish or verify things within disciplines.
This depicts a condition of incessant and interminable disagreement, 
in which not only are there no absolute or eternal winners, there are 
not even agreed criteria for determining what notions like ‘survival’, 
‘demise’ or indeed ‘fittest’ might possibly mean. (Has hoplology 
‘survived’? In what way? Is it ‘the fittest’? For what?) In this kind of 
context, there will always be more to any disagreement than one 
matter or one issue. Indeed, ‘disagreement’, in this sense, can usefully 
be formulated as follows – as ‘less a confrontation between two 
established positions – as in the case of a debating society – than an 
engagement between “parties” that do not antedate their confrontation. 
A disagreement constructs the object of argumentation and the field of 
argumentation itself’ [Arditi 2008: 115].
outside of a field be universally acknowledged as existing or operating 
in an informed, experienced or expert enough fashion to adjudicate 
on what takes place within the field? Do scientists ask philosophers 
to adjudicate on and decide the value of their methods and findings? 
Do lawyers? Kant thought that all fields could be interrogated and in a 
sense audited by philosophy. But do those working in fields other than 
philosophy agree? Indeed, do philosophers really (still) feel entitled, 
informed or expert enough to do so?8 
Of course, there are many crossovers and connections between certain 
fields. Work in one discipline often incorporates elements developed 
in other disciplines. Economics is often heavily involved in the use 
of mathematics, for instance. And the academic study of visual art 
regularly calls upon the approaches and insights of such fields as history, 
philosophy, cultural theory, sociology, and so on. But such crossovers, 
connections or collaborations are neither entirely free, nor inevitable, 
nor established without a battle or disagreement. Rather, such 
connections are contingent achievements, produced either through a 
sense of ‘obviousness’ (or appeals to norms – as in, ‘of course the study 
of art and the study of history overlap and interact’) or through the 
effort of making the case for the validity of their connection (as in, 
‘perhaps recent advances in meteorology could be applied to help us 
learn more about cultural dynamics’).
Currently, art history rarely appeals to mathematics for justification or 
corroboration of the knowledge produced in its own disciplinary space. 
Although it is not impossible or inconceivable, any move to make the 
discourse or discipline of art history reliant upon mathematics – or 
subject to any kind of mathematical validation – would be met with 
considerable resistance within that field. To propose that the academic 
discourse around fine art, art history, and so on, should be subject to 
mathematical procedures would provoke a vehement battle. But the 
point to be made here is that this battle would merely be different in 
scale or intensity, not kind, from the ongoing day to day disagreements 
within the academic study of fine art and art history around such 
matters as whether, say, the psychoanalytic paradigm developed in the 
wake of the work of Jacques Lacan is of more use to art scholars than 
the sociological paradigm of Pierre Bourdieu, and so on.
8  One reader of a draft of this article commented: ‘All the ones that I talk to 
do!’ The reader then went on to suggest that faith in one’s methods to tackle any problem 
actually seems to be part of the nature of a discipline. Furthermore, the reader suggested, 
this may also be why so many researchers would rather bring their ‘tried and true’ methods 
to martial arts studies than stop to ask ‘Is this question significant, and is this method an 
appropriate lens for addressing it?’ This is so even though asking such questions seems to 
be such an important first step.
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such questions as why and how. Different answers produce differing 
conceptualisations of the aim, object and field, and entail different 
approaches. So we need to ask: What are our aims? Which approaches 
best serve such aims?
In the terms of Thomas Kuhn’s now classic approach to understanding 
the ways that academic knowledge is produced, established and 
transformed, the emergent field of martial arts studies would currently 
be classified as ‘pre-paradigmatic’ [Kuhn 1962; Nicholls 2010]. This is 
because there is little to no consensus about its objects, orientations, 
methodologies or approaches. Some connections, crossovers and 
collaborations across disciplines are being formed, thanks to newly 
formed research networks, conferences and increasingly visible 
publications. But the wider field has long been confined to discrete 
islands of disparate disciplinary approaches in small enclaves. So, 
although some scholars are now producing works that engage with the 
question of the approaches and paradigms of martial arts studies, there 
remains much that still needs to be done to establish anything like a 
coherent topos.10
There is much to be said about this. But what I principally want to 
argue in what follows – in an argument that runs contrary or transverse 
to many discussions and impulses in and around the field – is that none 
of this entails a ‘need’ to define martial arts.
Against Definition
There is a widespread belief in and around the nascent discourses of 
martial arts studies that a primary and orientating task must be to define 
martial arts [Monahan 2007; Cynarski 2008; Lorge 2012; Channon and 
Jennings 2014; Cynarski, Sieber, and Szajna 2014; Lorge 2016]. The 
matter of defining martial arts has also prompted some valuable recent 
reflections on the many problems and issues that it raises [Wetzler 
2015; Judkins 2016b; Channon 2016]. However, I want to intervene 
by arguing that this very belief and orientation harbours problems 
[Bowman 2015a; Bowman 2016b]. More precisely, my argument is that 
10  Hence the importance of the question of the paradigms of martial arts 
studies. From the outset, we must pluralise the question because it is evident from the 
range of scholarship and avenues of enquiry currently beginning to be explored across the 
disciplines that differing conceptualisations of both object and field emerge reciprocally 
with different approaches and orientations. To establish the paradigms of martial arts 
studies, one approach would be to map current approaches, analyse their orientations and 
interrogate their current and potential interconnections, in order to generate an overarching 
awareness of the field in its multiplicity and heterogeneity. Of course, the question that 
arises here is that of the map itself: what are the characteristics of the lens through which 
the cartographer is looking?
In academia, the mode and manner of our argumentation, as well as 
the very object of our attention itself, must all be understood to be 
essentially particular kinds of institutional construct. Our objects are 
‘disciplinary objects’, essentially invented within, or at least ‘worked 
over’ by our own discourses [Mowitt 1992]. Our approaches to them 
are constructs too. This is so even though many people seem to believe 
that academic disciplines and fields just happen; that they are born 
spontaneously or emerge ineluctably in response to external realities of 
the world. However, this is not at all the case. Academic subjects are not 
born, they are made.9
The Paradigms of Martial Arts Studies
In light of this, it is important to realise that an early and essential 
challenge for the nascent field of martial arts studies was always going 
to be the field itself. That is to say, at the same time as exploring and 
engaging with problematics within the field, it is also necessary to more 
clearly and indeed securely establish martial arts studies first as a field 
of study, and then as a legitimate field of study [Bowman 2015a; Wetzler 
2015].
This matter may not seem to amount to too much of a serious problem, 
given the abundant empirical evidence that martial arts studies is a field 
that is mushrooming internationally. There are currently conferences 
and publications appearing in many languages in many countries. 
But the fact that this is happening without much in the way of a 
conversation about how to study martial arts is troubling [Bowman 
2015a; Wetzler 2015; Judkins 2016a]. History is littered with failed 
attempts to establish any kind of coherent and sustainable academic 
discourse of martial arts studies. As I have been suggesting, perhaps this 
is in large part because of a lack of sustained communal effort to forge 
conceptual development via cross-disciplinary dialogues.
Moreover, in the present moment, we should not forget that until very 
recently, one of the most frequently posed questions in and around 
these waters was: will martial arts ever be a valid topic of academic study? If 
today we are hearing a resounding ‘yes!’, there nonetheless remain not 
only ‘strictly academic’ but also ‘pressingly practical’ reasons for posing 
9  There are many accounts of these processes. See, for example, Anderson 
on the formation of English Literature as a global discipline [Anderson 1991], Hall on 
the formation of cultural studies [Hall 1992], Fabian on how anthropology constructs its 
objects [Fabian 1983], Chow on the invention of film studies [Chow 2007], or, perhaps most 
famously, Foucault on the invention of psychiatry [Foucault 1989 (1963)]. Indeed, as one 
commentator put it to me: why should there be a field of martial arts studies, distinct from 
the wider study of movement, performance and embodied knowledge?
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For Theory
Fortunately, early work in the recently established journal Martial 
Arts Studies has, from the outset, attempted to move beyond the 
(dis)orientation caused by becoming trapped in the taxonomical 
labours associated with defining. Issue one of Martial Arts Studies, 
for instance, contained several different efforts to conceptualise the 
field and to work out ways that it could profitably and productively 
develop [Bowman 2015b; Wetzler 2015; Farrer 2015; Barrowman 
2015]. Significant among these is Sixt Wetzler’s ‘Martial Arts Studies 
as Kulturwissenschaft: A Possible Theoretical Framework’ [Wetzler 
2015].12 This article is a particularly notable contribution to the field, so 
I would now like to turn to it.
In his article, Wetzler carries out a number of important tasks. He 
identifies the pitfalls that can arise when academics use the object-, 
folk-, or practitioner-language of the practices that they are taking as 
their objects of study. From here he broaches the problem of adequate 
academic terminology, asking: what terms should scholars use when 
talking about this or that aspect of martial arts in/and/as culture, 
politics, history or society? He argues that academic terms should 
surely not be the same as the terms and concepts used by practitioners 
themselves, either to characterise what they do or to carve up the 
conceptual spectrum of categories and hierarchies. This discussion 
moves Wetzler into a reflection on the well-worn problems of 
conceptualisation and – surprise, surprise – definition.
In an important move, however, rather than arguing for or against this 
or that definition of martial arts, Wetzler deconstructs and reveals the 
limits of a range of conventional and popular categories that circulate 
within martial arts discourses, and points to the essential impossibility 
of establishing fixed referential categories in these waters [28]. He 
proposes instead that martial arts studies analyses should be orientated 
by looking for and at the ‘dimensions of meaning’ attendant to any 
given construct of martial arts. To this end he proposes five plausible 
but always provisional dimensions of meaning: preparation for violent 
conflict, play and competitive sports, performance, transcendent goals, 
and health care. After making a case for these dimensions and inviting 
others to expand or refine his conceptualisation of them, Wetzler turns 
to the matter of how to conceive of, frame, and conceptually manage 
(in order to analyse and discuss) matters of martial arts studies without 
falling into what Derrida would call ‘metaphysical traps’, what cultural 
theorists would call ‘essentialism’, and what Wetzler calls the pitfalls of 
‘lexical illusion’.
12  My own contribution was entitled ‘Asking the Question: Is Martial Arts Studies 
an Academic Field?’ [Bowman 2015b] In this article, I stopped short of explicitly addressing 
the question of which particular theories or approaches the field might involve (even 
though my preferences were surely readily inferable).
it is actually an error to think that forging definitions must be primary, 
or indeed even necessary, in academic work. Often, the belief in the 
necessity of definition is already an effect of a tacit acceptance that a 
certain manner, mode or register of academic discourse must be the 
proper, best or necessary method. Indeed, it arguably boils down to a 
belief that the only or best kind of academic work is scientific, and that 
science starts from definitions.
There are at least two problems with this. One problem lies with any 
attempt to make studies of human life, culture and society emulate 
‘science’. In our case, this would take the form of trying to force the 
study of martial arts to conform to a certain (scientistic) conception of 
science. For it is important to be aware that scientific approaches are 
neither the only nor necessarily the best, nor sometimes even viable 
approaches. (Must we use scientific methods to explore martial arts 
in/and literature, film, music, gaming, philosophy, religion, gender, 
identity, or politics, and so on?) The second problem relates to the idea 
that science starts with definitions. This involves a misunderstanding of 
science. Science starts from theory. Scientific method always and only 
boils down to the attempt to test, verify or falsify a theory.11 Such work 
often seems to involve numbers, but science does not necessarily involve 
numbers. Some statements about science or elements of it involve 
numbers. But what is primary in science is theory.
On the other hand, or at the other end of the supposed spectrum of 
approaches, even putatively non-scientific approaches to any subject 
also involve theory – whether consciously acknowledged or not, and 
whether the theory is postulated explicitly (to orientate the work) 
or whether it emerges out of the work, through different kinds of 
encounter with ‘objects’, ‘things’, ‘processes’, ‘phenomena’ or ‘stuff’ – 
and regardless of whether we want to call such stuff ‘text’, ‘evidence’, 
‘material’, ‘archive’, ‘fieldwork’, ‘results’ or ‘data’. The belief that such 
encounters, or any results or statements about any of this, necessarily or 
properly begins or ends with ‘definition’ is a misunderstanding. As such, 
any approach that positions the matter of how to define martial arts as 
if it is a primary or somehow fundamental question is misconceived or 
badly formed.
As Alex Channon has recently reminded us (although he argues for the 
utility of principled moments of definition), definitions quickly produce 
hierarchies, and help to erect values, borderlines, norms and exclusions 
[Channon 2016].
11  One reviewer of this article challenged my use of the word ‘verify’ here, as 
it jars with scientific terminology. However, I have elected to keep the word, because my 
thinking is more influenced by Jacques Rancière than by scientific method per se. Rancière 
argues that attempts to establish, prove or argue for something – anything, anywhere – 
ultimately involve constructing ways of trying to verify (rather than falsify) the proposition, 
position or belief one is supporting [see for instance Rancière 1992].
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The way to avoid making conceptual mistakes, Wetzler argues, is to 
find an adequate theory. The one he proposes as valid and viable for 
martial arts studies is Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory. Wetzler quotes 
the following important passage from Even-Zohar:
Systems are not equal, but hierarchized within the polysystem. 
It is the permanent struggle between the various strata … 
which constitutes the (dynamic) synchronic state of the system. 
It is the victory of one stratum over another which constitutes 
the change on the diachronic axis. In this centrifugal vs. 
centripetal motion, phenomena are driven from the centre to 
the periphery while, conversely, phenomena may push their 
way into the centre and occupy it. However, with a polysystem 
one must not think in terms of one centre and one periphery, 
since several such positions are hypothesized. A move may take 
place, for instance, whereby a certain item (element, function) 
is transferred from the periphery of one system to the 
periphery of an adjacent system within the same polysystem, 
and then may or may not move on to the centre of the latter. 
[Even-Zohar 1990: 13-14, quoted in Wetzler 2015: 28-9]
Then Wetzler explains how this theoretical paradigm might be used in 
martial arts studies:
Transferred to the development of the Asian martial arts 
in Western culture within recent decades, this means: The 
total realm of the martial arts is the polysystem in question, 
which can itself be understood as a system within the ultimate 
polysystem ‘culture’. The cultural meaning of the polysystem 
‘martial arts’ is not monolithic, but instead consists of several 
systems that each have their own relevance within the 
polysystem. Such systems might be ‘use for self-defence’ or 
‘preferred way of combat for the silver screen’, while the ‘items’ 
that occupy these systems are the individual martial arts styles. 
[28]
Furthermore, the theory seems to offer ways to conceptually grasp 
change within and across systems. Wetzler continues:
To clarify with an example: Upon its arrival in the West, 
karate was perceived mostly for the Dimension 1: Preparation 
for Violent Conflict, and thus at the centre of the system ‘self-
defence’. However, it has been driven to the periphery of ‘self-
defence’ by other styles, especially by wing chun, which was 
then in turn driven from the centre by krav maga. Regarding 
the perception of Dimension 2: Play and Competitive Sports, 
karate was again driven from a centre, this time of the 
category ‘tough combat sport’, in this case by kickboxing, 
which was replaced by Muay Thai, which was replaced by 
MMA. However, not all is lost for karate. When the style held 
the centre of the self-defence system, it also had a connotation 
of being a pastime for bullies and hooligans. While losing the 
centres of those systems karate was able to gain ground in the 
systems including ‘martial arts for pedagogical purposes’ and 
‘self-perfection by Eastern practices’ (both systems obviously 
representing Dimension 4: Transcendent Goals), whose centres 
it shares today with other Japanese budo styles, along with 
yoga, qigong, and various meditation practices in the second 
case.  
[Wetzler 2015: 28]
Wetzler’s ensuing discussion of the insights that such an approach 
opens up is extremely suggestive and rewarding – even though it does 
not broach the matter of how anyone might ever establish what is at 
the ‘centre’, ‘periphery’ or other ‘position’ of this or that ‘system’ – all 
of which will surely always be in question. Nonetheless, it has already 
generated (or at least enriched) some highly significant work, most 
notably in the form of Benjamin N. Judkins’ recent study of the Star 
Wars inspired phenomenon of Lightsaber combat [Judkins 2016a].
Using the ‘five dimensions of meaning’ that Wetzler proposes can be 
associated with martial arts practices in different configurations at 
different times and in different places, Judkins easily demonstrates that 
the perhaps unlikely pastime of Lightsaber combat training can in fact 
entirely reasonably be classed as a martial art. This is so even though 
such a conclusion might surprise or dismay certain scholars of martial 
arts and even if many of Lightsaber combat’s own practitioners would 
not feel entirely comfortable making such a claim.
Judkins’ approach to the quite possibly controversial example of 
Lightsaber combat, informed by Wetzler’s intentionally rigorous 
(looking) framework, has the benefit of challenging quite a few 
different positions – including, most importantly, any essentialist or 
‘referentialist’ approach that proceeds on the assumption that something 
is a martial art if it is somehow ‘obviously’ a martial art. So, such works 
as these by Wetzler and Judkins – along with the arguably even more 
radical approach of recent work by Chris Goto-Jones, which argues that 
certain kinds of computer gaming can become martial arts practices 
[Goto-Jones 2016] – are all valuable, and not least because they 
foreground the limitations of any hasty attempt to define martial arts. 
Moreover, not only do such approaches all problematize the impulse to 
rush to definitions, they also do so without sidestepping or avoiding the 
issue of how to specify and handle martial arts as an object of academic 
attention.
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recurrently, in making appear – in each alleged system, in each 
self-interpretation of and by a system – a force of dislocation, a 
limit in the totalization, a limit in the movement of syllogistic 
synthesis. Deconstruction is not a method for discovering that 
which resists the system; it consists, rather, in remarking, in 
the reading and interpretation of texts, that what has made 
it possible for philosophers to effect a system is nothing 
other than a certain dysfunction or ‘disadjustment’, a certain 
incapacity to close the system. Wherever I have followed this 
investigative approach, it has been a question of showing that 
the system does not work, and that this dysfunction not only 
interrupts the system but itself accounts for the desire for 
system, which draws its élan from this very disadjoinment, or 
disjunction. On each occasion, the disjunction has a privileged 
site in that which one calls a philosophical corpus. Basically, 
deconstruction as I see it is an attempt to train the beam of 
analysis onto this disjointing link.  
[Derrida 2003: 3-4]
Systems fail to be systematic; system is impossible. This also accounts 
for the desire for it, and the possibility of the deconstruction of it. 
Adding ‘poly’ to the word ‘system’ does not solve, resolve or dissolve the 
matter. Pluralizing merely defers acknowledging the fact that there may 
be no system other than in the ‘lexical illusion’ of the eye that wishes to 
perceive/believe that there is systematic organisation and some kind of 
systematic process at work, even if we can only ever ‘discover’ (invent) 
it afterwards.
As an alternative to what Derrida would call ‘metaphysical’ thinking 
about systems, the poststructuralist notions of text and discourse 
provide alternative concepts, metaphors, vocabularies and paradigms 
[Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Mowitt 1992; Bowman 2007]. Key here 
are the notions of relation or relationality, on the one hand, and force, 
on the other. It seems worthwhile to discuss these notions further, 
as they are important dimensions, but they are currently un- or at 
least underdeveloped in Wetzler’s proposed framework for analysis in 
martial arts studies.
To start with the matter of relation first. Can an identity ever be said 
to be anything other than relational? As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe argued in the 1980s, ‘identities are purely relational’ so ‘there 
is no identity which can be fully constituted’ [Laclau and Mouffe 
1985: 111; Bowman 2007: 18-19]. Already this kind of perspective, 
with origins in Saussurean linguistics and semiotics, problematizes 
the notion of ‘elements’ within a ‘system’, and replaces the notion of 
‘entities with identities’ with a much more fluid sense of their ongoing 
incompletion and irreducible contextuality.
For my purposes, a key value in this work is the demonstration of the 
primacy and productivity of theory before definition. Such frameworks 
clearly exceed the frames and orientations of hoplology, for instance, 
which is mired in inessential preconceptions and doxa. As such, it is 
in full support of Wetzler’s efforts and in broad agreement with the 
orientations of such scholars that my present contribution to this 
debate about definition and theory aspires be read. This is so even 
though my own contribution does involve criticisms of Wetzler’s 
proposed theoretical paradigm for martial arts studies. But these 
are less like fundamental disagreements and more like questions for 
further consideration. Importantly, any criticisms I have will neither 
be ‘anti-theory’ nor ‘pro-definition’. Rather, in what follows, I seek less 
to disagree with Wetzler and more to point out some potential pitfalls 
and problems attendant to any avoidance of theory or insistence on 
definition in martial arts studies.
Defining Problems: Relationality before Definition
A well-known part of the problem that arises when trying to define 
the objects or foci of martial arts studies is semiotic openness, slippage, 
instability and the incessant ongoing changes that take place across 
cultures, communities, societies, technologies and practices. Wetzler 
tackles this by proposing a framework for structuring academic inquiry 
and proffering a set of theoretical terms for grasping what he represents 
as ‘systemic’ but what I would prefer to call discursive change. I prefer 
to approach the world in terms of the language of texts and discourses 
rather than elements, functions, systems and polysystems, and so 
on, for ontological reasons that boil down to the primacy (proposed 
by poststructuralist theory) of relationality, rather than the notion of 
‘system’ or even ‘systematicity’. As Derrida writes of ‘system’:
If by ‘system’ is meant – and this is the minimal sense of the 
word – a sort of consequence, coherence and insistence – a 
certain gathering together – there is an injunction to the 
system that I have never renounced, and never wished to. This 
can be seen in the recurrence of motifs and references from 
one text to another in my work, despite the differing occasions 
and pretexts…. ‘System’, however, in a philosophical sense that 
is more rigorous and perhaps more modern, can also be taken 
to mean a totalization in the configuration, a continuity of all 
statements, a form of coherence (not coherence itself), involving 
the syllogicity of logic, a certain syn which is no longer simply 
that of gathering in general, but rather of the assemblage of 
ontological propositions. In that case deconstruction, without 
being anti-systematic, is on the contrary, and nevertheless, 
not only a search for, but itself a consequence of, the fact 
that the system is impossible; it often consists, regularly or 
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Almost two decades after his influential 1985 monograph with Chantal 
Mouffe, in a dispute with Slavoj Žižek about politics and society, Laclau 
was still making the same arguments. In response to Žižek’s now 
infamous (and what Laclau always regarded as ill-thought-through) 
adoption of a kind of crude Marxist and quick Leninist position on the 
question of how to make radical political change in the world, Laclau 
argued that:
We gain very little, once identities are conceived as complexly 
articulated collective wills, by referring to them through 
simple designations such as classes, ethnic groups and so on, 
which are at best names for transient points of stabilization. 
The really important task is to understand the logics of 
their constitution and dissolution, as well as the formal 
determinations of the spaces in which they interrelate.  
[Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000: 53]
Laclau pitched his argument about how to approach political entities, 
identities and processes in terms of the vocabulary and concerns of 
a poststructuralist and post-Marxist political theory, whose essential 
proposition runs like this: because everything – and by ‘everything’ 
what is meant is everything – can be seen to be contingent and hence 
conventional, then therefore everything is to be regarded as irreducibly 
political [Arditi and Valentine 1999; Marchart 2007].
There is much to be said about this argument [Bowman 2007; 
Bowman 2008]. I return to it here not just as a rejoinder to Wetzler’s 
advocation of an irreducibly metaphorical use of ‘system’ (even though 
he seems to present ‘system’ as if it is not metaphor but reality), but also 
because I believe it is vital (and vitalising) to try, as Laclau urges us, ‘to 
understand the logics of [the] constitution and dissolution [of entities 
and identities], as well as the formal [or informal] determinations of the 
spaces in which they interrelate’.
This is important not least because, if ‘identities’ can also be understood 
as ‘complexly articulated collective wills’, then to understand either 
‘wills’ or ‘identities’ as arising ‘systematically’ could have a problematic 
impact on the way we understand such important matters as (for 
example) political struggle. Stated bluntly, to rely on polysystem theory 
might cause us to follow a line of thinking in which political struggles 
and political identities come to be conceived as somehow merely being 
the systematic unfolding of some kind of predetermined plan.
This is why the notion of force is also key. Entities and identities are not 
just matters of signification, or of systems, but also of force. Force is 
the other side of signification, a key part of the process of establishing 
meaning [Protevi 2001]. This is why Laclau believes we should not be 
content with the moment of referring to entities and identities ‘through 
simple designations such as classes, ethnic groups and so on’: because 
such terms ‘are at best names for transient points of stabilization’. 
In other words, signification should not be studied in isolation from 
considerations of force.13
So, Laclau’s broadly deconstructive perspective challenges us to 
think about the making or establishment of any identity in a way that 
exceeds the lexical illusion of systematicity and emphasizes instead 
the complexity of contingent processes of articulation [Laclau 1994]. 
This differentiated perspective – which replaces ideas of structures and 
systems with those of iteration, reiteration, dissemination, dislocation, 
and so on – forms the main part of my critique of the use of polysystem 
theory in martial arts studies, or at least my critique of Wetzler’s 
advocation of it. However, to reiterate, making such a critique is not 
my primary aim here. Wetzler is a sparring partner, not an opponent. 
Rather, the matters that I ultimately want to challenge are somewhat 
different.
Changing Discourses
Specifically, I want to point out that Laclau’s approach to discourse 
analysis involves rather different investments than thinking about the 
academic definition of any activity, entity or identity. Indeed, although 
Laclau’s argument here includes the injunction that academics be 
rigorous and forensic in their conceptual grasp of their key terms, 
it is not limited to this injunction. Moreover, the position Laclau 
advocates does not merely involve the endless or supposedly ‘useless’ 
problematizing of terms (something deconstruction was once regularly 
accused of), whether to try to reconfigure and refine the definitions and 
13  Laclau’s use of the word ‘stabilization’ here is significant. It seems to owe 
something to the fact that Derrida once emphasised the importance of the ideas of 
stabilisation and destabilisation in a published conversation with Laclau in the 1990s 
[Mouffe 1996]. In his response to Laclau and others, Derrida said: ‘All that a deconstructive 
point of view tries to show, is that since convention, institutions and consensus are 
stabilizations (sometimes stabilizations of great duration, sometimes micro-stabilizations), 
this means that they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus 
it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because stability is not natural; it is because 
there is instability that stabilization becomes necessary; it is because there is chaos that 
there is a need for stability. Now, this chaos and instability, which is fundamental, founding 
and irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we struggle with laws, rules, 
conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same time it is a chance, a 
chance to change, to destabilize. If there were continual stability, there would be no need 
for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that 
politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that 
the possible and the impossible cross each other’ [Derrida 1996: 84].
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distinctions that academics use in their work or those that practitioners 
use in their practice, or to show them to be impossible.
Rather, for Laclau – and indeed for the overwhelming majority of 
works of cultural theory developed through and since the 1980s – the 
fundamental point to be taken on board is not that we should work 
out how best to define something; it is rather that we must face up 
to the fact that ‘things’ are neither simply nor necessarily ‘things’: 
that all identities are at root contingent discursive achievements, 
or establishments, or, to use Laclau’s words, ‘transient points of 
stabilization’.14
Moreover, our shared use of a term like ‘martial arts’ or ‘system’ 
stabilizes our discourse. But it can also impose and project a fixed 
view – our present view – of all sorts of dimensions of culture 
and society, both backwards in time and outwards across different 
linguistic, geographical, cultural, religious and social contexts. 
So, the establishment of a shared and stable term has its benefits 
(predication and communication being among them). But it inevitably 
also comes at a cost – which we might render in a number of ways, 
including projection, simplification, hypostatisation, generalisation, 
transformation, or even cultural, conceptual or linguistic imperialism.
Wetzler calls this ‘lexical illusion’. As in: we say ‘martial arts’ in English 
here today, but did or do they say or mean anything like it there 
(elsewhere) or then (elsewhen), without difference or remainder? 
Or are we misrecognising the things ‘out there’ (and ‘then’) that we 
talk about in our terms, here and now? As an example, consider how 
frequently it is currently said that ‘mindfulness meditation’ has been 
practiced within Eastern movement traditions and martial arts for 
millennia. (Before we heard this said so much about mindfulness, we 
heard it said about qigong [Palmer 2007]. And before that, it was said 
about yoga [Spatz 2015]. And so on.) Such propositions are all based on 
acts of fantasy and projection, back into a fantasized notion of ‘long, long 
ago’ [Fabian 1983].
Such acts of projection are clearly faulty. They also have any number 
of potential ideological dimensions and material and discursive effects. 
Consider a second example. On a tour I was given during a visit to the 
new Mecca of Taekwondo in South Korea, the Taekwondowon, our 
guide pointed to a picture of an old statue and said, ‘look, this is a statue 
14  Accordingly, given that ‘martial arts studies’ takes its very name and focus 
(‘martial arts’) from what Wetzler deems to be the dubious and problematic realm of ‘object 
language’, there can therefore be no ‘metalanguage’ that is not contaminated by this fact. As 
Laclau and Mouffe argued in the 1980s, because there is never anything like a fixed centre, 
stable system, or simple outside, there can be no metalanguage [1985].
of someone doing taekwondo: that posture comes from taekwondo’. 
The fact that taekwondo was only invented in the 1950s [Gillis 2008; 
Moenig 2015] and that its patterns (or kata) were only subsequently 
changed from the Japanese martial arts from which it was derived, 
seems to problematize the idea that an ancient statue may depict a 
taekwondo posture. The possibility that the taekwondo posture might 
have been invented deliberately to depict the ancient statue in order 
to strengthen the ideological claim that taekwondo is ancient was not 
really encouraged or entertained at all.15
Entities and identities are discursive achievements, produced through 
efforts and institutions, arguments, demonstrations, articulations, 
demonstrations, and indeed processes and acts of institution (where 
‘institution’ is to be read as both noun and verb). What something ‘is’ 
emerges through forceful – often enforced –  processes of narration 
and representation. ‘Mindfulness’ is an entirely modern construct. 
‘Taekwondo’ is no older than the 1950s. The resignification of such 
institutions as ancient is an effect of the contingent but motivated 
modes and manners of their discursive articulation and emergence.
Optimistic Relations
Theoretically, I have revisited some broadly poststructuralist points (all 
too) briefly here because I believe that remembering and taking into 
consideration these lessons in our various ongoing research projects 
into martial arts – and the international development of the field of 
martial arts studies – will allow us to move on, and specifically to move 
on from a certain kind of fixation on definition. (Neither Wetzler nor 
Judkins suffers from this fixation, however, and my comments about 
the problems with definition are not directed towards either of these 
scholars.) 
I am drawing attention back to poststructuralist theory because, rather 
than orientating and habituating us into an academic life of taxonomical 
labours centred on defining and demarcating, such approaches proceed 
from the proposition that identities are always irreducibly relational 
and incomplete, and hence contingent, open and ongoing. Identities are 
constituted by and within discourses, and they always emerge as points 
in clusters of moving constellations of related, contiguous, cognate, 
differentiated, associated, contrasting and oppositional terms, in all 
kinds of possible relations – linguistic, semiotic, lived, institutional, 
academic, legislative, and so on.
15  After my visit, I blogged about this here: https://goo.gl/FXVF6T. I also went on 
to discuss it in ‘Making Martial Arts History Matter’ [Bowman 2016] and in Mythologies of 
Martial Arts [Bowman 2017].
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Their more or less opposite opinion is that, on the contrary, what 
we all always need is an explicit theory. I say explicit theory, and not 
just ‘theory’, because, arguably, everyone always has a theory, even if 
they don’t consciously know what it is. By ‘explicit theory’, here, I am 
referring to anything from an overarching theory of ontology to an 
actively thought-through image or sense (to use Laclau’s terms again) 
of how discourses and identities are constituted, and the logics of their 
processes of establishment, stabilization, interaction, transformation, 
and dissolution.17
It is in this sense that I am arguing for more theory, an injection of 
theory, and the permeation of theory, before definition. But I am not 
proposing a return to the intellectual battles of the 1980s and 1990s, in 
which the introduction of Continental Philosophy into the humanities 
led to a state of trench warfare between those who ‘did theory’ and 
those who ‘did empirical work’ [Hall 2002]. Furthermore, although I am 
arguing explicitly ‘for theory’, I want to be clear that I am certainly not 
therefore arguing ‘against empirical work’, or ‘history’, or ‘reality’, or 
anything like that. Moreover, I would follow neither Žižek nor Derrida 
nor anyone else who might ever position capital-T-Theory or capital-
P-Philosophy as the necessary start or end point of ‘proper’ academic 
work on martial arts.
Rather, I want to insist that it will be vital and vitalising for work 
in martial arts studies to embrace certain aspects of cultural theory, 
especially when – as in the current moment – people seem to feel an 
apparent ‘need’ to do something properly academic, a need that so many 
people seem to believe is to be interpreted as defining our object. For, 
faced with the (apparent) challenge of ‘needing’ to define, as we have 
already seen, with even the tiniest bit of theory, we are able to pause 
to reflect on the fact that before definition there is relation. Words and 
meanings and practices and values travel and twist and turn and 
change and move in relation to larger and other forces and processes. 
These may or may not be systemic, systematic (Wetzler, Even-Zohar), 
conjunctural (Hall), discursive processes of articulation (Laclau), or 
‘dislocated’, ‘out of joint’ or even ‘hauntological’ [Derrida 1994 (1993)], 
and so on.
All such theories would concur that martial arts will always be 
relationally determined. Laclau and Mouffe theorised this in terms 
of ‘discourse’ and ‘articulation’ [Laclau and Mouffe 1985]. Stuart 
Hall insisted on the need to establish a sense of what he called the 
‘conjuncture’. According to Hall, any analysis requires what he called 
‘conjunctural analysis’ – that is, an analysis informed by an acute 
17  I use the word ‘sense’ here, because I think that we can only ever get an image, 
sense or feeling for ontology anyway. I hesitate to say ‘structure of feeling’. This is because, 
as Derrida himself made clear, the very idea, term, notion or (possible) concept of ‘structure’ 
is rarely ever much more than a metaphor anyway.
One point to be emphasised again is the role not just of lexical illusion 
but also of force within the construction of entities and identities. 
Whether using what Wetzler terms object language or metalanguage, 
we always think through and with inherited terms, and hence 
conceptual differentials and differentiations – inheritances that we are 
more or less forced to work with and, to some degree, within [Derrida 
1976 (1967)].16
Now, although I am critical of the scramble for definitions, nonetheless, 
it strikes me that the growing prominence of the matter of definition 
does attest to a lot that is promising in the current stage of development 
of martial arts studies. It is evidently a reflection of the drive to found 
and ground and legitimate and build the field rigorously, and according 
to proper academic protocols. To this extent, despite the scientistic 
features of some forays into this new terrain, our current moment is of 
great significance. So we may be optimistic. However, in the current 
rush to try to define and establish ‘things’, there is always the risk that 
we labour under misapprehensions. My concern is that some of the 
misapprehensions we see arising today may come to constitute an 
obstacle or impediment in the development of the field tomorrow, 
pushing it towards becoming something dominated by what Žižek once 
termed ‘naïve empiricism’ or ‘naïve cognitivism’ [Žižek 2001]. Decades 
before Žižek, Derrida too had worried about something similar, that he 
called ‘incompetent’ and even ‘irresponsible’ empiricism [Derrida 2001 
(1967)].
What such thinkers mean in making claims like ‘empiricism is naïve, 
incompetent, or even irresponsible’ – is that there is a kind of untenable 
idealism and simplicity at the heart of approaches that begin from the 
premise that to make sense of the world we should simply look around 
us, focus on things, classify them and count them; and that through a 
process of testing and disputing around categories, we might eventually 
get at the truth of reality and get it right. 
16  Nonetheless, as Saussure taught us, when we are thinking about our 
linguistically instituted categories, first and foremost we must remember that there are only 
‘differences without positive terms’. Moreover, as Derrida went on to demonstrate, there 
are no easily specifiable or simply stable referents ‘behind’ these differences. The flipside 
of signification is force [Protevi 2001]. There is no stability in signification without force. 
Furthermore, as Gayatri Spivak added: the institution of any difference in the production of 
an identity in discourse, the drawing of any demarcation that distinguishes and hierarchizes 
entities and identities, is essentially and irreducibly a political act, with more or less overtly 
political consequences [Spivak 1990; Spivak 1993]. Such poststructuralists sometimes 
even formulate dimensions of this in terms of violence [Bowman 2010]. This means that, 
if we were to follow this logic through to one of its conclusions, it would become possible 
to argue that more or less any identity is in some sense ‘martial’ (it has either been fought 
for or fought against), as well as stabilized but conflictual. Within martial arts studies, quite 
what these acts and their consequences may be remains to be seen. But hopefully such 
reflections as this may cause some hesitation, and possibly reorientation, before the battles 
continue over this or that ‘correct definition’.
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awareness of the historical moment and context, and the forces and 
relations that produced it. Without this, we cannot really know or 
understand anything about any entity or identity, whether martial arts, 
class, ethnicity, or any other kind of identity or entity in process.
Of course, there may be many ways to characterise and analyse a 
conjuncture. As deconstruction sought to teach us, no context is ever 
fully closed [Derrida 1988]; so we might never know for sure whether 
we know for sure everything salient about a context or a conjuncture. 
Maybe we can’t really know for sure that we know anything at all for 
sure. Yet what we can do is attempt to assess a context in terms of forces 
and relations, relative weights and gravities, and the ways in which 
forces and fields constitute, colour and condition entities, identities and 
practices. This may not be too far from Wetzler’s proposed use of Even-
Zohar’s polysystem theory – or it may be a world away.
Alternative Discourses
In this article, I have proposed the necessity of theory for martial 
arts studies, and entered into a critique of one proposed branch of 
theory. I have done so because part of what needs to be theorised is the 
orientation of the discipline’s discourse, and I would prefer to steer that 
discourse as far away from anything approaching scientism as possible. 
My chief criticism of the tropes of ‘systems’ would be that this approach 
risks pointing the discourse of martial arts studies back towards a 
scientistic orientation.
Given this criticism, an obvious question is what, therefore, my 
proposed alternative approach would be. My answer relates to my 
ongoing arguments from poststructuralism about the need for attention 
not just to signification (‘dimensions of meaning’) but also to force, as in 
the forms of different relations to and entanglements within different 
kinds of social, cultural, economic and other forms of power.
In Britain, Raymond Williams long ago proposed that it is possible 
to formulate and look at entities, practices and identities and to assess 
them in terms of whether they are dominant, residual or emergent, and 
to ask whether they may be acting in ways that are either in line with 
a dominant or hegemonic ideology, or whether they may be alternative 
or even oppositional to it [Williams 1977]. This may seem like quite 
an old and crude paradigm. This kind of approach has certainly been 
hugely refined and developed over the decades [Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; Laclau 1994; Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000]. But I draw attention 
to this seminal paradigm here because, even as simple as it is, it offers 
a viable and flexible framework through which many different kinds 
of studies of martial arts and society might be initiated. All of these are 
happily liberated from the stifling imperative to define and demarcate 
without any real sense or sensitivity to the complexities of matters of 
time, place and the interplay of forces that both produce and transform 
meanings, practices and contexts.
To illustrate the value of this framework, we might quickly consider 
one final example: the deliciously marginal or problematic case of 
taijiquan. Using Williams’ approach, we will be able to reconfigure 
discourse and debate about taijiquan, away from a sclerotic fixation 
on the question of whether it can even be ‘defined’ as a martial art or 
a combat sport, or self-defence, or a form of what we now insist on 
calling ‘mindfulness meditation’, etc., and into an understanding of 
what ‘taijiquan’ has been and has done and might be and might do in a given 
conjuncture.18
As Douglas Wile has argued, taijiquan emerged in a discursive foment in 
which China was threatened ideologically, economically and politically 
[Wile 1996]. Its 19th century proponents elaborated its philosophy 
along obscurely yet immanently nationalist lines, so that taijiquan came 
to stand in stark opposition to any and all things Western or European 
[see also Lorge 2016]. In this process, residual Taoist ideas and 
principles were mixed into a growing alternative worldview that was 
oppositional to everything supposedly non-Chinese. This is also precisely 
why Maoism tolerated taijiquan, of course, and why it ‘survived’ the 
Cultural Revolution: it amounted in its elaboration to a collective, 
combined, non-Western, non-competitive, non-individualistic 
calisthenics avowedly rooted in a non-religious worldview. But this was 
‘survival’ via a formalisation that amounted therefore to a mutation on 
a genetic level. So, in a sense, post-Mao, the term taijiquan essentially 
had a transformed meaning referring to a transformed practice [Frank 
2006].
In its journey to the West, as we know, in the Western imaginary, 
taijiquan was ostensibly deracinated from any nationalistic inflection 
or valence, and became articulated to (connected with) a range of 
open-ended discursive configurations or conjunctures: from the 
counterculture to new age ideology and onwards into therapeutic and 
even medical culture [Frank 2006]. In all this, it becomes differently 
articulated or constructed at different times and places, often existing 
with utterly contradictory and heterogeneous (non-systemic, non-
systematic) partial, immanent or potential meanings at the same time. 
Furthermore, any of those involved in taijiquan in any of its different 
18  Note again the way that we now ‘see’ ‘mindfulness’ everywhere, from 
meditation in modern America to martial arts in ancient China, even though even a few 
years ago we wouldn’t have seen anything as mindfulness, anywhere, because no one other 
than a few specialists were using the term.
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times and places will believe themselves to be either or both learning a 
martial art, either or both for sport or for self-defence, and/or involved 
in healthful calisthenics, and/or preserving or changing a culture, and/
or involved in a religious or mystical practice. And so on.
We can multiply our examples, and look at the ways in which certain 
words and moves have drifted and disseminated and flipped and 
mutated all over the place, around the world, through time and space, 
and examine the processes of their emergence and development within 
each new context; the ways they become mixed up and mixed in with 
existing concerns and outlooks, and reciprocally modify and move 
existing situations. This may or may not be systemic or systematic.
I have mainly referred to the theoretical models of people like 
Laclau, Derrida, Hall and Williams here. And I have done so mainly 
because I believe that there is – to a greater or lesser extent – a kind 
of theoretical ontology that connects their outlooks, despite their 
many other differences. This outlook is essentially poststructuralist or 
postfoundationalist [Sedgwick 2003].19 And as much as many people 
may still have a distaste for so-called ‘high theory’, I maintain that 
martial arts studies will only benefit from a sustained engagement with 
what there is to be learned from high theory – as much as there is to be 
learned from engaging with the most intimate ethnography, the most 
detailed historiography, the most multi-layered sociology, and so on.
Some of the first lessons relevant to us here would relate to an 
awareness of the slippage and vicissitudes of signification that require 
us to pay very close attention to the shifting and drifting apparent 
referents of our focus, their different meanings in different times 
and places, the genetic mutations and quantum leaps that occur in 
‘cultural translation’ from one time to another, one place to another, 
one language to another, even one utterance or instance to the next, 
and the rather frustrating fact that, despite our eternal desire to see 
unity and simplicity, cultures and practices are always ‘in bits’, always 
in process, incompletion, dispute and contestation. There is no unity 
to the lexical illusion that guides us, whether it be martial arts, combat 
sports, self-defence, culture or society – apart from that which seems to 
be conferred by the use of such terms themselves.
Discussing such entities often has much in common with discussing 
unicorns, fairies, justice, Father Christmas, or how many angels might 
fit on the head of a pin or through the eye of a needle. Discussing such 
things can create a ‘reality effect’ that can lead people to believe these are 
19  Interestingly, Sedgwick [2003] also sees an affinity between poststructuralist 
and Buddhist ontologies, and she ponders whether she is drawn to the former because of 
her interest in the latter or to the latter because of her agreement with the former.
actually existing real and unitary things [Bowman 2012]. All meanings, 
all practices, are stabilizations. The questions to be asked then surely 
include explorations of why certain stabilizations take place at certain 
times in certain ways, why some people often become so fixated on 
fixation or stuck on stabilization, and what it is that both stabilization 
and destabilization are ‘doing’ in any given context at any given time.
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